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The produce of the earth - all that is derived from its surface by
the united application of labour, machinery, and capital, is divided
among three classes of the community; namely, the proprietor of the
land, the owner of the stock or capital necessary for its cultivation,
and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated. [...] To de-
termine the laws which regulate this distribution, is the principal
problem in Political Economy. David Ricardo, On The Principles
of Political Economy and Taxation. London: John Murray, 1817
(third edition 1821)
1 Introduction
The central place that Ricardo accorded the subject of income distribution
in 19th century Political Economy is appropriate also in 21st century Socio-
Economics. Although the eld was relatively neglected by economists for several
decades, in the last fteen years there has been a resurgence of interest driven
partly by developments in economic theory and partly by major developments in
the interpersonal income distributions within many developed countries (Atkin-
son 1997).
In recent years the subject of economic inequality has developed in such a
way as to have a life of its own separate from the obvious connection with the
distribution of income, the distribution of wealth, the structure of wages and
other related empirical topics. This distinct area of study has been built upon
new insights in welfare economics and on the relationship to information theory
(Cowell 2000, Sen and Foster 1997).
Our treatment of this pair of subjects is organised as follows. Section 3
examines the ways in which economic analysis has attempted to explain what
drives income distribution; in section 4 we will look at ways of analysing the
personal income distribution as a prelude to a more thorough consideration of
inequality (section 5); section 6 looks at new directions in which the analysis
may proceed. But rst let us briey think about the main focus of our subject.
2 Income
Why the focus on income rather than some other measurable quantity? In many
treatments of the subject income plays one of two roles, sometimes both:
 Income as a proxy for economic welfare. If one adopts an individualistic,
welfarist approach to social economics then it is reasonable to be concerned
with individual well-being or utility. In some respects the ow of income
captures this, but it has been argued that consumption expenditure may
be a more appropriate economic indicator (Blundell and Preston 1998).1 It
1Among other things use of consumption data can avoid a number of di¢ cult technical
problems that arise from the presence in practice of zero and negative incomes.
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should also be acknowledged that individual well-being may be determined
not only by the level of ones own income but also by its relation to the
incomes of others (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005).
 Income as command over resources. This role of income can be interpreted
in more than one way. If one has in mind spending power then perhaps
disposable income (income after taxes and compulsory deductions?) may
be an appropriate concept. But if inequalityis associated with economic
power and status then a measure of wealth may be more appropriate.
The focus on income as conventionally dened clearly has shortcomings. An
uncritical use of income in either of the above roles may neglect questions of time
(peoples incomes often change systematically over their lifetime) and of risk
(peoples incomes often change erratically in the short run): more sophisticated
income concepts can be used that take account of these factors, but it is harder
to get reliable data to estimate them. Also left open are important theoretical
and practical questions: for each type of income one needs to be clear about
who or what the income receiveris (a single person? a family or household?
a rm? a taxpayer?); particular care must be taken when using standard data
sources to make international comparisons (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001).
3 Economics and income distribution
In economic analysis income distributionis interpreted in two principal ways:
the functional distribution of income  i.e. the distribution of income among
factors and the size distribution of income (or distribution of income among
persons).
We briey deal with the way each of these is conventionally handled in
economics, focusing on the forces that determine the shape of the income dis-
tribution (section 3.1). Then, in section 3.2 we will look at challenges to the
orthodoxy and the way these challenges have enhanced our understanding about
the analysis of income distribution in recent years.
3.1 The standard approach
Functional distribution. The functional distribution of income is an inte-
gral part of the economic analysis of relative prices, output and employment.
In this sense there are several theories of income distribution corresponding to
di¤erent theoretical and ideological stances on these central issues. However,
these various analyses usually focus on the same basic economic concepts: em-
ployment of the factors of production land, labour and capital and the rates
of remuneration of their services rent, wages and prot.
The conventional approach is to treat questions of distribution as part of
the neoclassical analysis of prices and resource allocation in a story such as
the following. A competitive rm takes the price it can get for its output and
the prices it must pay for inputs as given in the market: it selects its level of
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output and adjusts its demand for inputs so as to maximise prots at those
prices; each household takes as given the prices paid to it for the labour services
supplied by members of the household just as takes as given the prices to be
paid for goods and services it needs, and: it adjusts the quantities of the goods
and services demanded or supplied in the market so as to maximise satisfaction
within the limitations imposed by its budget. In this story prices adjust so as to
ensure equilibrium in all markets: equilibrium means that aggregate supply of
each commodity is at least as great as aggregate demand. In particular factor
incomes, the reward for each type of labour, each natural resource and capital
asset is determined by its market clearing price. So the functional distribution
of income the issue referred to directly by Ricardo in the epigraph is in this
way automatically determined by the market mechanism. Shocks to the system
for example changes in the stock of natural resources alters, or a shift in the
preference patterns of consumers will change the income distribution through
this mechanism as prices adjust to new equilibrium levels.
Personal distribution. The distribution of income between persons or be-
tween households can be tted into the above scenario. Key decisions that
determine incomes in the long run can each be analysed as particular cases of
the households optimization problem: household saving, self-investment in hu-
man capital or the purchase of education for children are determined by price
signals. To complete the theory of income distribution within this framework
one also needs a description of the system of property rights that prevails within
the community. The question of who owns the natural resources, the capital
equipment and the prots of the rms is central to the determination of house-
hold incomes: household budgets are jointly determined by market prices and
property rights and will be a¤ected by a change in the pattern of ownership, or
in the system of ownership.
However, more is required to complete the personal income distribution
story. In order to draw conclusions about the distribution of income in the
long-run one also needs to consider the evolution of property rights across the
generations.(Piketty 2000).This will depend, among other things, on how fam-
ilies are formed (do the rich predominantly marry the rich?2 do the poor have
more children?) on the motives for bequeathing wealth to the next generation
(do parents compensate disadvantaged children? is the amount bequeathed the
outcome of dynastic optimisation or largely a matter of chance?3) and the role
of the State through taxation (Cremer and Pestieau 2006).
3.2 Challenges and developments
The orthodox neoclassical story outlined in section 3.1 has been called into ques-
tion on account of its restrictive assumptions concerning the economic processes
involved. Because these assumptions are central to the theory rather than be-
2See for example Fernández et al. (2005), Liu and Lu (2006).
3See for example Arrondel and Laferrère (2001), Kopczuk and Lupton (2007).
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ing merely convenient simplications, many economists have questioned the
relevance of various aspects of the standard account of income distribution. We
may briey mention three points of focus.
The role of prices. The predominant interest of neoclassical orthodox the-
ory of income distribution in smooth adjustments to market clearing equilibria
may be inappropriate to a theory of the functional distribution of income. As a
response to this, economists who are strongly inuenced by Keyness approach
to macroeconomics have developed a number of alternative theories of the func-
tional distribution of income using components of the Keynesian system, for
example the work of Kaldor (1955) and Pasinetti (1962). Key features of such
alternative theories are rule-of-thumb savings decisions by capitalists and work-
ers and a rigid technique by which labour and capital are combined to produce
output; they play a role in some of the modern theory of growth and its rela-
tionship to factor incomes (Bertola 1993).
Monopoly power. The standard theory neglects barriers to competition and
the monopoly power as of secondary importance in the competitive market
story. Restraints on competition  in the form of segmentation of the labour
market and outright discrimination are of major importance in analysing the
lower tail of the size distribution of earnings; and monopoly power may be
particularly important in the upper tail, for example, in the determination of
earnings in professions with restricted entry. Monopolistic pricing by rms has
also been seen as of prime importance in the functional distribution of income
(Kalecki 1939): such power plays an important part in the Marxian concept
of exploitation and in distribution theories based on struggle between classes
representing di¤erent factors of production. The assumption of competition
is also likely to be inadequate in analysing economics that have a substantial
public sector.
Modern treatments of the labour market take seriously the problem of monop-
sony by powerful rms in determining labour incomes and the potential role for
a minimum wage (Manning 2003).
Information. The standard story in section 3.1 assumes e¤ectively perfect
information on the part of economic agents. However, uncertainty is itself a po-
tent force generating inequality in both labour income and income from assets,
in that the rich not only are better able to bear risk but also may have superior
information which can be exploited in the stock market and the labour market.
Moreover, some of the barriers to competition may have been erected by rms
in response to uncertainty. Hence considerable interest has developed in the
distributional implications of theories of output, employment and the structure
of wages that explicitly incorporate imperfect information, in particular screen-
ing and signalling, phenomena that may result in equilibrium income inequality
(Salanié 1997). Because of imperfect information it is in the interest of economic
4
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Figure 1: Parade diagram, US income before tax 2003
agents to make use of social networks formed from social contacts which may
also buttress equilibrium (Ioannides and Loury 2004, Manski 2000).
4 The personal distribution
4.1 Representations of income distribution
Let us rst examine the problems of depicting and interpreting the personal
income distribution; then we will briey consider the merits of formal modelling.
Statistical tools. To present the bald facts about income inequality one could
just draw an empirical frequency distribution (histogram). But it is worth
considering two other presentations of the data that have become familiar in
the literature; we will illustrate the techniques using readily available tax data
from the United States.
The background story for the rst presentation is eloquently set out in Pen
(1974).4 Imagine that each persons height were in proportion to his income
and that the entire population were to le past in a parade that lasted exactly
one hour. If we do this thought experiment for the US then the picture that
emerges is that shown in Figure 1.5 It is clear that this is just the inverse of the
4Pens story was originally told for the UK and for income distribution data from the 1960s.
Nevertheless the central message is still valid for the 21st century and for other countriesdata.
5Source: http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0id=134951,00.html. Table
1.12003, Individual Income Tax Returns, Selected Income and Tax Items, by Size and Ac-
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conventional distribution function F : if x is income then p = F (x) gives the
proportion of the population with incomes less than or equal to x and Figure 1
just plots x against p. One standard feature of empirical income distributions
emerges clearly from the diagram: the dotted line depicts the position of the
person with average income ($48,889) and it is clear that this is more than two-
thirds along in the parade (so that the mean is substantially greater than the
median).
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Figure 2: Lorenz Diagram, US income before tax 1987 and 2003
The second standard presentation is shown (using the same data source)
in Figure 2. The horizontal axis is just as for Figure 1: on the vertical axis
is plotted s, the income shares of the population. The Lorenz curve (Lorenz
1905) is a graph of income shares against population shares for a particular
distribution so that a particular (p; s) point can be read as the bottom 100p%
of the population receive 100s% of total income.6 It is clear that this graph
captures an intuitive concept of inequality comparison: to see this Figure 2 also
includes the corresponding graph for 1987; note that the share of the bottom
50% of the population (p = 0:5) in 2003 is unambiguously less than in 1987 and
that the same conclusion would have been obtained if we had chosen any other p-
cumulated Size of Adjusted Gross Income. These data do not embody the ideal denition of
income and income-receiver for welfare analysis (below) but they can be conveniently used to
illustrate all the techniques presented here. The data have been truncated below to eliminate
negative and zero incomes to provide a consistent distribution that can be used in all the
presentation techniques covered below Pen (1974) did not truncate his data, but used only
the parade presentation.
6Two points to note. (1) Because the population is implicitly arranged in ascending order
of income the graph must be increasing and convex and start from (0; 0). (2) If there were
perfect equality then everywhere we would have p = s and the Lorenz curve would be a
straight line; following convention this has been drawn in Figure 2.
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value; so according to this shares rankingincome seems to be more unequally
distributed in 2003 than in 1987. One might wonder whether the intuition could
or should be formalised: this point is taken up in section 5 below.
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Figure 3: Pareto Diagram: US Pretax Income 2003 ( = 1:95)
Modelling the distribution. Once one considers anything beyond the sim-
plest example of interpersonal income distribution there is a strong temptation
to nd some way of simplifying the representation of the distribution and its as-
sociated inequality. One way of doing this is to use a parametric model in other
words a suitable functional form, where suitabilityis interpreted as meaning
that the salient features of the empirical distribution are captured. There are
several candidate functional forms borrowed from statistics including the log-
normal, beta and gamma distributions (Cowell 2007, Kleiber and Kotz 2003),
but of particular interest is Pareto (1965)s insight, all the more remarkable
since it was based on the limited data available at the end of the 19th century.
Figure 3 presents the same information as that presented in Figure 1 but now
it plots 1   F (x) against income x, each on a logarithmic scale. A naked-eye
inspection suggests that the points where x is at least $50,000 lie almost on a
straight line, as shown.7 If one accepts the straight-line representation on this
diagram for x  x0 where x0 := $50; 000 then in this income range we have
F (x) = 1 

x
x0

7For demonstration purposes this has been tted using OLS to the top 11 observations.
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where the parameter  is the slope of the tted line in Figure 3 .
Clearly the advantage of this is that the complexity of the distribution is
reduced to a single parameter   the lower is the value of this parameter,
the fatter is the tail of the associated frequency distribution and, in some
sense, the higher is the inequality displayed by the distribution. Some of the
disadvantages are obvious: no attempt is made to capture information from the
bottom end of the income distribution, the estimate of  may be quite sensitive
to the statistical method employed (Cowell and Victoria-Feser 2007) and the use
of  as an indicator equality is based on nothing stronger than an informal
impressionistic argument.
From the time of Paretos discovery of this relationship (1896) there has been
interest in whether it somehow characterises a lawof income distribution 
whether the straight-line approximation described above is generally a good one
(it is) and whether it is reasonable to assume that across countries there is a
natural tendency for  to approach one particular value (it isnt) (Persky 1992).
4.2 Income distribution: recent developments
A renewed interest in income distribution has developed because of recent his-
tory of the personal income distribution. After several decades of apparent
stasis from the late 1970s onwards there has been a remarkable increase in the
dispersion of incomes in many countries. Figure 4 (taken from Piketty and Saez
2003) demonstrates one aspect of the situation for the case of the USA:8 this
charts the shares of the topmost income receivers over the 20th century.
The apparent secular increase in inequality is in both income derived from
assets (note the role played by capital gains in this) and in labour income. This
latter component has been driven by a recent increased dispersion of wage rates
in industrialised countries (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, 2000); explanations
for this remarkable phenomenon have been sought in the e¤ects of technological
advances on wage dispersion via productivity growth(Acemoglu 2002, Blau and
Kahn 1996, Goldin and Katz 1996, Krueger 1993, DiNardo and Pischke 1997)
and in the e¤ects of international trade (Burtless 1995, Krugman and Venables
1995, Marjit and Acharyya 2003, Richardson 1995),
5 Inequality
To pass from the description and analysis of income distribution to a systematic
consideration of inequality one needs to address a number of questions about
the value judgments implicit in inequality comparisons and a number of ethical
and practical questions associated with the use of an inequality measure.
8The increase in inequality shown by the shares ranking (Figure 2) is consistent with this:
in contrast to Figure 2 which plots the income share s of the bottom p of the population,
Figure 4 plots 1  s (corresponding to the top 1  p of the population) against time.
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Figure 4: Top income shares in the United States
5.1 Connections with income distribution
Values. Perhaps the overriding question is, why one should be concerned with
inequality? The standard answer is that it is rooted in an ethical approach to
distributional questions (Sen and Foster 1997). Further, social values are in
turn related to individual concerns and views: people care about distributional
fairness and they reveal a concern for fairness through their behaviour in exper-
imental settings (Charness and Rabin 2002, Fehr and Fischbacher 2002, 2003);
to some extent a concern for fairness is also revealed in surveys (Inglehart et al.
2004)
A fundamental concept that is usually applied in inequality comparisons
captures an element of this fairness-in-distribution point. The transfer princi-
ple (Dalton 1920) states the following: take an n-person income distribution
(x1; x2; :::; xn) where xi is the income of person i; for any i and j among these
n persons consider the distribution formed by transferring a small amount of
income  from i to j (so xi is replaced by xi    and xj is replaced by xj + );
then, if xi < xj the income distribution must become more unequal, if xi > xj
the income distribution must become less unequal. We have seen a glimpse of
this principle in the representation of the income distribution using the Lorenz
curve (Figure 2): one can imagine the 2003 distribution being created from
the 1987 distribution by a series of poorer-to-richer transfers that successively
reduce the income shares of the poorer members of the community; this implies
that the 2003 distribution (outer Lorenz curve) must exhibit greater inequality
than the 1987 distribution (inner Lorenz curve) (Atkinson 1970).
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Measurement. Why should one be interested in inequality measurement?
One good answer is that the shares rankingoutlined in section 4.1 is limited
as a practical tool: the type of clear-cut conclusion drawn from Figure 2 (2003
is more unequal than 1987) is not always possible because in many instances
the relevant Lorenz curves intersect; to resolve the apparent ambiguity in the
Lorenz comparison a summary numerical value for each Lorenz curve is sought.
An appealing intuitive way of doing this is to take the area trapped between
the Lorenz curve and the equality line in Figure 2: the normalised value of this
area9 yields the Gini coe¢ cient. Formally the Gini is dened as
1
2n2x
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
jxi   xj j ; (1)
where x := 1n
Pn
i=1 xi denotes mean income. The formula (1) provides another
simple and natural interpretation: take all the possible pairs of income-receivers
in society (i; j) and compute the absolute di¤erence between their incomes the
Gini is a normalised average of those di¤erences.
In view of this attractive solution to the measurement problem, the question
arises, why not just use the Gini coe¢ cient to quantify inequality and leave
the matter there? There are two main points in reply. First, there are other
perfectly good summary statistics that combine intuitive appeal with familiarity
and simplicity of computation; for example, one could use the coe¢ cient of
variation vuut 1
n
nX
i=1
hxi
x
  1
i2
; (2)
which is obviously related to the variance; this and other intuitively reasonable
measures may deserve to be considered alongside the Gini coe¢ cient.10 Second,
it may be more appropriate to base inequality measurement on some sort of
social evaluation of income distribution rather than just on personal intuition.
5.2 Welfare economics and distribution
In the context of income-distribution analysis social welfare can be represented
as a value W (x1; x2; :::; xn) where W is a function with suitableproperties.
It is commonly, though not universally, assumed that social-welfare function
W can be written in additive form so that the social welfare associated with a
particular income distribution is given by
nX
i=1
u(xi); (3)
9Normalisation involves dividing this area by the area of the whole triangle, namely 1
2
.
This is exactly the same as the formula given in 1.
10Because di¤erent inequality measures encode di¤erent information about the income dis-
tribution, thay can give qualitatively di¤erent answers in cases where Lorenz curves intersect:
it is not hard to nd cases where the Gini indicates that distribution A is more unequal than
distribution B, but that the coe¢ cient of variation indicates the opposite.
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Figure 5: Social evaluation function u, equally-distributed-equivalent income x
and mean income x
where u is a social-evaluation functionwhich is increasing (so that more in-
come for person i means higher social welfare) and strictly concave (so that a
poorer-to-richer transfer will reduce W the transfer principle again). An ex-
ample of this type of function is given in Figure 5. Let us look at two important
ways in which this apparatus is used.
Welfare dominance. For the above special type of W -function there is a
nice relationship with the Lorenz concept. For any distribution construct the
Generalised Lorenz Curve (GLC) by multiplying each income share by the mean
of the distribution; then if the GLC for distribution A lies somewhere above and
nowhere below the GLC for distribution B social welfare must be higher in A
than in B for every possible W of the above type (Shorrocks 1983).
Figure 6 draws the GLCs for the US data that we used earlier: it is clear
that the two curves intersect, but what does this mean? Both average income
and inequality increased over 1987-2003; social welfare increased because of the
rst e¤ect and decreased because of the second, but neither of the two e¤ects
dominates; di¤erentW s, corresponding to di¤erent specications of u in (3) will
yield di¤erent conclusions as to whether welfare rose (because of the growth in
total income) or fell (because of the more unequal shares in total income).
Welfare-based inequality measurement. Find the income level which, if
received by everyone, would yield the same level of social welfare. From (3) this
11
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Figure 6: Generalised Lorenz Diagram. US income before tax 1987 and 2003
(in 2003 $)
is a number x such that
u(x) =
1
n
nX
i=1
u(xi): (4)
x is a e¤ectively a dollar measure of social welfare and is illustrated in Figure
5, for a two-person income distribution (x1; x2). If x1 and x2 are moved further
apart from each other then clearly the gap between x and the mean x increases;
so we could use the proportionate size of this gap, 1   x=x, as an index of
inequality. In the special case where u (x) takes the form 11 "

x1 "   1 this
concept yields the class of Atkinson indices (Atkinson 1970):
1 
"
1
n
nX
i=1
hxi
x
i1 "# 11 "
(5)
The number ", the degree of relative inequality aversion, is a parameter that
characterises individual members of the class of inequality and may take any
positive value.11 It encapsulates the imputed social values regarding inequality:
at the limiting value of zero one is imputing complete indi¤erence to inequality,
so that social welfare is measured by mean income (x = x); as successively
higher values of " are considered we are imputing a higher premium on inequality
and, for any given income distribution, the gap between x and x will increase.
11The limiting form of u as " ! 1 is log(x) and the limiting form of (5) as " ! 1 is
1  exp   1
n
Pn
i=1 log(xi=)

.
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To illustrate, suppose we calculate social welfare for the 1987 and 2003
income-distribution data, taking this specic form of the social-evaluation func-
tion u. We can do this using the equally-distributed equivalent income x: for
successively higher values of inequality-aversion " we will get lower values of x
in each of the two years. The results are depicted in Figure 7: for low values of
" (close to indi¤erence to inequality) welfare is clearly higher in 2003, reecting
the higher mean income in that year; but for higher values of " (above about
0.76, where the curves cross) the premium being put on inequality is so high
that welfare is counted as higher in 1987 than in 2003.
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Figure 7: Social welfare for di¤erent degrees of inequality aversion. US income
before tax 1987 and 2003 (in 2003 $)
6 New directions?
Two broad channels show considerable promise for the immediate future of
research on income distribution and inequality.
Data developments The availability of new, reliable data sources almost
inevitably has a stimulating e¤ect on research. The development of micro-data
on incomes in developing economies has facilitated not only the analysis of
income distribution within each country concerned but the tricky question of
13
meaningful international comparisons. It enables one to better address questions
such as whether inequality is good for growth (Aghion et al. 1999) and the
directions that the world distribution of income is taking (Sala-i-Martin 2006).
However, as Figure 4 shows, signicant improvements in data availability
are not conned to developing countries. A renewed interest in the ne detail
of the income distribution among the seriously rich has led to the synthesis of
data from tax authorities that has added a new perspective to international
comparisons Piketty (2007); new work making available micro-data on wealth
will also enhance understanding of what is going on in the upper tail of the
income distribution (Sierminska et al. 2006).
Inequality and the basis for social intervention The idea of inequality
has long been associated with public policy prescriptions, addressing questions
of whether more resources should be devoted to redistributive programmes, the
meaning of tax progression and so on. For the last 35 years or so this literature
has largely been based on essentially a welfarist approach to social judgments
(Sen 1979). Moreover the particular form of welfarism has typically been rather
narrow: the nature of inequality and of inequality aversion has been sought in
a kind of social analogy with risk and risk-aversion.
Recent years have seen a reappraisal of this theoretical underpinning. The
analysis of preferences under uncertainty and of preferences has been devel-
oped to richer models than simple expected-utility and to encompass broader
concepts of risk-aversion (Chateauneuf et al. 2004); this is leading to parallel de-
velopments in the treatment of the concept of inequality aversion (Chateauneuf
and Moyes 2000). Furthermore the growing appreciation of the contribution
of behavioural public economics (Bernheim and Rangel 2005) has led to a
search for an understanding of social-welfare criteria that are not based on sim-
plistic models of individual rationality. Along with this a strong interest has
developed in nonwelfarist policy prescriptions that are based on broader crite-
ria of fairness and that show appropriate concern for individual responsibility
(Fleurbaey 2008, Kanbur et al. 2006). This reappraisal has inuenced thinking
about the ethical basis of inequality analysis: Devooght (2007) has examined
a responsibility-sensitive approach to income inequality and Cowell and Ebert
(2004) have shown how alternative philosophical approaches to welfarism can be
encapsulated in inequality measures that are related to concepts of deprivation.
These developments are likely to ensure that concerns with inequality will
remain high on the socio-economics research agenda for some time to come.
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